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Abstract 
In this paper we discuss forestry issues related to land reform in Bolivia. We 
find that although the current land reform satisfies most of the conditions that 
are necessary for adequately addressing development issues in the agrarian 
sector, it does not deal with many of the challenges related to forest 
management and actually contains provisions that come in conflict with the 
objectives of sustainable forest management. Given that a large part of the land 
that is being titled is actually forest land, the above mentioned omission and 
conflict with the objectives of sustainable forest management is critical and 
may have harmful ramifications for the preservation of forest resources as well 
as poverty alleviation of forest-dependent communities. 
Keywords 
Forest tenure, forestry, land reform, agrarian reform, Bolivia. 
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LAND REFORM IN BOLIVIA  
THE QUESTION FORESTRY 
1 INTRODUCTION 
There is ongoing debate over the interpretation of divergent country 
experiences with land reforms; given the available evidence on the evolution of 
the effectiveness of such policy interventions, some authors have reached the 
conclusion that land reform is losing potential to achieve the goals of poverty 
alleviation and rural development (Deininger et al., 2007), or that alternative –
and seemingly less contentious policies– are better at achieving the same goals 
(cf. Dasgupta and Pellegrini, 2009). Nevertheless, the issue of land reform is 
cyclically resurfacing in the policy debate and it has come to the fore again in 
Latin America to deal with the rooted inequalities in the region (de Janvry and 
Ground, 1978; Deininger and Binswanger, 1999; Kay and Urioste, 2007). 
One Latin American country where the issue of land reform is paramount 
in the public discussion of measures to deal with inequality and promote rural 
development is Bolivia. In this paper we analyze the Bolivian experience with 
the current round of land reform that started in 1996 and continues to this day. 
Our method is to evaluate the ‘standard’ requirements for successful land 
reform –as they are identified by the literature on land and agrarian reform and 
as applied in Bolivia– with respect to the ‘special’ conditions that characterize 
Bolivia. These conditions include the necessity to address the development of a 
forestry sector, or to address the forestry question that we define here as the 
quest for a set of policies that promote the dual objectives of sustainable forest 
management and poverty reduction for the communities dependent on forests. 
The first round of land reform was implemented in Bolivia in 1953, 
however –like many countries that experienced ambitious land reforms since 
the beginning of the 20th century– it was not successful in addressing inequality 
in assets neither in a lasting manner nor in contributing to socio-economic 
development (e.g. Kay and Urioste, 2007). These experiences stand in sharp 
contrast to successful land reforms: for example, in Taiwan and South Korea 
where land reforms have striking accomplishment in terms of inequality 
reduction, promotion of rural development as well as providing the basis for 
equitable national development (Kay, 2002).  
A number of conditions for successful land reform are recognised in the 
literature and the complexity of these conditions is one of the reasons why 
many land reforms have failed to achieve their objectives (Thiesenhusen,1995). 
Accordingly land reform might actually be an effective policy instrument but 
only when all the conditions are met and as a consequence, one crucial part of 
land reform itself becomes setting up the enabling conditions for its success.  
The current land reform in Bolivia does satisfy many of the conditions 
that are necessary for land reform to adequately address development issues in 
the agrarian sector, but does not deal with many of the challenges related to 
forest management and actually contains provisions that come in conflict with 
the objectives of sustainable forest management. However, when we analyse 
the land that is being titled, we find that a large part of it is actually forest land. 
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However, the reform measures undertaken by the government does not 
include (nor is complemented with) provisions to address what we call the 
“forestry question”. A survey of the state of the forestry sector in general and 
its poor performance in the recent years makes us conclude that land titling per 
se is unlikely to give appropriate answers to the challenges faced by individuals 
and communities involved in forest management and that in the case of Bolivia 
the conditions for a successful land reform necessarily have to include the 
development of the forestry sector.  
The linkage between land reform and forestry is little debated in the 
Bolivian context and in many instances state institutions seem oblivious of the 
nature of the land being titled. The issue, however, is relevant beyond Bolivia 
because the land reform process is coming to the fore again in Latin America 
and at the same time forests are being increasingly titled to communities 
(White and Martin, 2002; Sunderlin et al., 2008) and we expect similar 
challenges to arise elsewhere. The discussion is also urgent as the issue of 
forest management has received little attention in the land reform literature 
(notable exceptions are Borras, 2006; Futemma and Brondízio, 2003; Alston et 
al., 2000; Pacheco et al., 2008). 
In the next section, we summarize the conditions for successful land 
reforms as recognised in the literature and consider different approaches to 
land reform. Subsequently, we discuss the connections between land reform 
and forestry and provide evidence that most of the land being titled is forest 
Next, we provide an assessment of the forestry framework and finally we focus 
on how the land reform process and the forestry question are interconnect in 
Bolivia. We find that if land reform is carried out neglecting the forestry issue it 
might not solve structural inequalities and might contribute to the problem of 
deforestation and forest degradation that, in turn, aggravate poverty. 
2 LAND REFORM: VISIONS AND INSTRUMENTS 
FOR SUCCESS 
At some point in the last century land reform has been enacted in most Latin 
American countries with varied results (de Janvry 1981; Thiesenhusen, 1995). 
The primary objective of these reforms was to provide access to land as a 
means of livelihood to the landless or land-poor and in the process break down 
the structures of social domination and exploitation that prevailed in the rural 
areas. The moves were often also justified on grounds of increasing 
productivity on land by providing incentive to small holders to produce 
intensively and to invest more on the land (Berry and Cline, 1979).  
The extensive literature on land reform, both theoretical and empirical, 
allows us to identify the key features of what might constitute a “successful” 
land reform. In this regard, we will focus on three specific issues: political will, 
tenure security and the role of complementary policies. We talk about success 
in terms of fulfilling the stated objectives of such a land reform policy as 
mentioned above.  
A critical condition –probably the most important one– for land reforms 
is the political will to implement it effectively. Given distributive conflicts 
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arising with the reform and the fact that a constellation of conditions must be 
met, the simple enactment of laws does not suffice and continuing support and 
efforts are required for actual implementation and ultimately for success.1 As 
much as attempts are made to design and implement land reform as a 
technocratic public policy initiative, genuine land reforms remain intense 
political acts due to their redistributive element. Political will might take the 
form of strong and determined governments, which see land reform as 
important (see the case of Taiwan, South Korea and China in Griffin et al, 
2002). Alternatively, social movements outside the government may rally for 
land reform measures and force the government to implement them (Huizer, 
1999). Social movements which culminate into revolutions and bring about 
land reform in the process are extreme cases where progressive governments 
come into power on the basis of popular demands where land reform figures 
prominently. 
Another decisive issue for land reform is secure tenure, which in turn is 
crucial to promote investment and legal protection in the face of a political 
backlash that could try to reverse the outcomes of a land reform programme. 
Technically secure tenure can be achieved with a transparent system of land 
records, existing or to be established together with land titling. A well-known 
case with respect to policy reversals –that can take place if tenure is not fully 
secure– is that of Chile where substantial land reforms were repealed in steps 
after the coup against the socialist president Salvador Allende (see 
Thiesenhusen, 1995) and the issue of compensation that the Sandinista left 
after losing power at the end of the 1980s (Stanfield, 1995). In both cases the 
absence of definite land titles and transparent records were responsible for the 
plight of the initial land reform beneficiaries many of whom lost access to land 
as new regimes not favourable to land reforms came to power. 
The presence of complementary policies, that within the agrarian 
paradigm include  agricultural extension, credit, marketing, are most often 
necessary to ensure that agriculture becomes viable for marginal farmers who 
are the typical beneficiaries of land reform and the history of land reform is 
replete with cases where reforms failed precisely because they were not 
accompanied by such policies. Griffin et.al (2002) have raised this issue in the 
context of the larger focus of development policies and the presence of the so-
called “urban bias” and “landlord bias”. Urban bias relates to the unequal 
emphasis of policy making and resource allocation of the government on the 
rural sector especially agriculture which continues to engage the majority of the 
poor in developing countries (Lipton 1977). Landlord bias on the other hand 
works in the form of agricultural policies which are mostly designed for or are 
appropriated by the large farmers or landlords. If land reform is to be 
successful in ensuring a better standard of living for the recipients of land, 
government policies should be directed specifically at the small farmers and at 
                                                 
1 Land reforms can be traced back at least to Roman times when, between the V and 
the II century BC, four land reform laws were passed with little effect because of the 
resistance of the Roman aristocracy that held a firm grip on key state powers 
(Ankersen and Ruppert, 2006). 
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the barriers they have to overcome to increase the productivity of their lands.2 
From a holistic development strategy perspective as well, land reform should 
be implemented in a setup where agriculture-industry-services linkages are 
properly exploited. So land reform or even rural development should not be a 
stand-alone strategy (Borras and Mckinley, 2006). As Kay (2002) argues, in the 
East Asian cases (Korea, Taiwan), land reforms created a relatively egalitarian 
agrarian structure and thus provided the genuine basis of a broad-based 
industrial development. 
While some of the instruments associated with land reform –as the ones 
mentioned above– are relatively uncontroversial, different visions of the 
agrarian question and of the purpose of the integration of the peasantry in the 
modern economic sector inform different approaches to land reform. Here we 
are going to present an overview of influential approaches and their diverse 
implications in terms of policy making with respect to land reform.  
On the contrary of what could be expected given the experience of 
progressive and socially inspired governments across the globe that are at the 
forefront in formulating and implementing land reform legislations, Marxists 
can be rather sceptical of land reform. In particular the creation of a landed 
petit bourgeoisie (i.e. the beneficiaries of the land reform process) that would 
become a conservative peasantry can be seen as an impediment towards the 
achievement of revolutionary conditions (Bernstein, 2002). In any case, 
regimes inspired by Marxist ideals have often undertaken the most radical land 
reforms characterised by large land redistributions and (often uncompensated) 
expropriation of large landholdings (see Lippit, 1974 for China). Furthermore, 
these reforms went on promoting forms of management such as cooperatives; 
also in order to contrast the risk of creating a conservative peasantry just 
mentioned. (Lipton, 2009) 
In the communitarian approach, the redistribution of lands should not 
benefit –at least not uniquely– individual owners. Communal ownership is 
recognised usually because of cultural and social traditions associated with 
indigenous populations and refers to traditional/existing organizational forms; 
but at times it is promoted because of the expected socio-economic and 
environmental benefits if compared to individual ownership (Bryden and 
Geisler, 2007). Instruments will include arrangements for forms of communal 
tenure (including cooperatives) and –possibly– forms of support such as 
agricultural extension given to social groupings rather than to individual 
farmers. In general the partner of the land reform agency and of the 
government will not be (near-) landless individuals, but organizations grouping 
several individuals and households.  
                                                 
2 Another condition that is often mentioned is that minimum land to man ratio or a 
minimum available land to (re)distribute. In fact, land scarcity is used often as an 
excuse against land reform even though some of the most successful cases of land 
reform have been implemented in agrarian societies with extreme scarcity like Taiwan 
and South Korea (see Griffin et al 2002). These experiences have shown that the 
scarcity problem is not a crucial one and land abundance is not a necessary condition 
for successful land reform. 
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These two approaches (Marxist and communitarian) are often 
characterized by a redistributive component: the allocation of land to the land-
poor sections of the population. The land reallocated can come from landed 
population (e.g. absentee landowners), but also from state-owned land. These 
redistributive reforms are in clear opposition to neo-liberal (market-led) 
reforms propagated recently by several multilateral organisations, including the 
World Bank (Borras, 2003). 
Market-led reforms are oriented towards the promotion of efficiency and 
increased productivity, to be obtained with the integration of the land into the 
market and the facilitation of markets for agricultural produce. The land 
market is established securing property rights and freedom to exchange land; 
the standard market mechanisms will lead to an efficient allocation of the 
productive assets. The most efficient producer –assuming well-working 
financial markets– will be able to discount the highest future production and to 
buy the land for a higher price if compared to less efficient producers. Hence 
allocation through unconstrained markets would be automatically associated 
with productivity increases (see Deininger and Binswanger, 1999).  
The approach to land markets will depend on the approach to land 
reform. In many cases selling redistributed land is not allowed at least in the 
short run and this provision is often associated with Marxist and 
communitarian reforms. One example is the Mexican land reform, where the 
communitarian approach was complemented by institutions such as the ejido 
the land held in common could not legally be dived nor sold. Given that most 
beneficiaries of land reforms are extremely vulnerable to shocks both at the 
sectoral (e.g. crop failure) and the personal (death, marriage etc) level, there is 
always a risk of losing land through distress sale or using land as collateral for 
consumption loans which are never repaid. In order to prevent this situation, 
land sales should not be allowed for the first few years after land reform 
(Banerjee, 1999). Eventually, when the initial benefits of access to land has 
been realized, land sales might be permitted in order to allow more efficient 
allocation of land resources and ripping the benefits of access to credit that is 
open conditional on the use of land as a collateral. This concern about small 
peasants retaining control over their land has generated some extreme 
responses where even the land rental market has been made practically 
inoperative through the prohibition of tenancy (see the case of Kerala, India in 
Raj, 1983). This kind of move, however, might have severe negative 
implications with peasants engaging in underground tenancy without any 
rights. In the neoliberal approach, while some restrictions on sales and rentals 
can be justified, they should be temporary in order to allow investment and 
productivity to achieve efficient levels (Deininger, 2003). 
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3 FORESTRY AND LAND REFORM 
3.1 The forestry policy framework: connections with land 
reform 
Forest dwellers and traditional communities in many developing countries are 
often characterised by the paradox of their proximity to abundant natural 
resources and their socio-economic marginalization (Dasgupta, 1993). With 
respect to forest resources this state can ultimately occur because of access 
problems (i.e. because communities lack endowments and entitlements over 
the resources), or because there are no economic conditions for the 
development of forest-based activities. Overall there is a consensus that the 
purpose of forestry policy is to combine the ecologically sustainable 
management of natural resources with economic and social objectives that 
include the transferring of endowments and entitlements to marginal 
communities and the development of a forestry sector (see Pellegrini, 2009).  
We now discuss forest tenure and different approaches to forestry policies 
and their connection with land reform. The security of tenure is even more 
important for forestry than for agricultural land because of the long-term 
planning and investments that are necessary to undertake sustainable forestry. 
By nature the management and harvesting of logs follows much longer cycles 
than those common in agricultural practices, but also the production of non-
timber forest products require long planning horizons since accelerated 
harvesting can degrade the quality of forest stands and compromise their 
potential productivity in the future. One extreme manifestation of the lack of 
tenure security in forests is the open access situation and the management 
problems associated (cf. Hardin, 1968 and Ostrom, 1990). In the open access 
case the products that have a market value in the forest will be rapidly depleted 
and forest degradation and/or deforestation follow. One fundamental 
instrument to achieve this security is that the land registry covers also forest, or 
alternatively that there is a reliable registry of forest ownership.3  
 Different approaches to forest management suggest alternative ways to 
address the forestry question. The scientific forestry (or command and control) 
approach is one that can be classified as technocratic: its focus is on forest 
management plans prepared by formally/professionally trained foresters and 
                                                 
3 While we are not mentioning all the conditions necessary for the development of 
forestry, another issue worth mentioning is the stability of the regulatory framework. 
While this issue is common to any sector in developing countries, is particularly 
important in the case of forest because of the long time frame necessary to organize 
any meaningful forest management. Changes in the regulatory framework can often 
suddenly make investments unprofitable; such changes include blanket logging bans, 
modifications of the species and products that can be harvested or of the forms of 
timber that can or cannot be exported (e.g. bans on the export of non-transformed 
logs). These changes in the regulatory framework generate problems with respect to 
the production strategies of forest owners and, ultimately, can backfire in the context 
of weak enforcement of the regulatory frameworks and result in illegal logging, forest 
degradation and accelerated deforestation (Pellegrini, 2009). 
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enforced in the field by state agents (Balogh, 2002). The approach neglects 
local traditional ecological knowledge, the social relations that exist in the 
forest and the linkages among local livelihoods and forest management; 
essentially the agency of local actors is ignored altogether. The orientation of 
the whole system is towards the efficient and sustained production of timber 
(i.e. the production of a monocrop; Shiva, 1993), to be achieved through 
measures that would create a favourable biological environment. The 
instruments to implement this model include a regulatory framework with clear 
guidelines on allowed activities and their organization (detailing extraction 
modalities and other management activities), an efficient forest service, training 
facilities for foresters and in general a well-working state machine to guarantee 
effectiveness and enforcement. This approach fits well in the dominant role of 
the state in the developmentalist paradigm of development hegemonic in the 
1970s. 
In contrast, the neo-liberal approach matches an emphasis on state failures 
(supported by abundant evidence of it from the 1970s experience in forest 
management in most developing countries) with a concern towards the tragedy 
of the commons and the perverse incentives that are created at the individual 
level when forest property rights are not well-defined or when they are in the 
hands of the state that often cannot enforce them effectively. As a result of this 
approach, the policy instruments will include the establishment of secure 
property rights –often understood simply as private property rights– and of the 
creation of the economic incentives promoting efficient exploitation of natural 
resources by individual economic agents and enterprises (e.g. World Bank, 
2008). The access issue here would be regulated with market mechanisms: the 
most efficient management agents would be more productive and ultimately 
gain increasing access to forest resources. 
Another approach –that has been gaining ground more recently and is part 
of the recent turn to poverty reduction in development discourse– is 
decentralization and community-based natural resources management. Overall 
this approach aims at solving the access problem of rural communities, 
recognising them as the owners of the forest and acknowledges the fact that 
communities – as it was emphasised in the literature on the management of the 
commons– are often better endowed to manage natural resources rather than 
state or private actors (Ostrom, 1990). This approach can be articulated in 
many ways: for example it can focus on partnerships and on the linkages across 
actors operating at different scales (Ros-Tonen et al., 2007), or on the social 
sector emphasizing the need for community agency and empowerment (Larson 
and Ribot, 2007). 
The evolution from approaches based on scientific forestry, to neo liberal 
and to decentralization is happening in a chronological order, but it is not a 
linear process nor is it actually possible for each approach to completely 
supersede previous ones. Furthermore, differences are not always so clear-cut 
and for example some strands of the communitarian approach are compatible 
with neo-liberal policies especially when advocating retrenchment of the state 
and the insertion of communities in existing markets (e.g. Chomitz and Buys, 
2007). 
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As a result the policies that we see in practice are often inspired by a 
mixture of different approaches (e.g. Pellegrini, 2009), references to the 
fashionable ‘buzzwords’ in the development discourse might be misleading 
(Büscher and Mutimukuru, 2007) and in many respects Latin American 
countries have forestry systems still inspired by colonial models (Larson and 
Ribot, 2007). 
3.2 Land reform, agrarian reform and forestry policy: 
synergies, neglect and conflict 
Land reforms may be characterised by synergies with forestry policy, but the 
nesting of land reform in the agrarian reform paradigm is often associated with 
a neglect of forestry issues and even with provisions that conflict with the 
objective of sustainable forest management. The direct linkages and synergies 
are most evident on the land titling programs, when titling forests can be 
interpreted as a forest tenure reform (Pacheco et al., 2008). Within the context 
of land reform, two aspects are especially relevant: titling of forest to poor 
communities (some of which are indigenous) and individuals and, generalised, 
increased security of rights over forest areas. In effect, through successful land 
reform marginalised communities obtain titles over forest and forest tenure 
security is increased fulfilling one of the conditions for sustainable forest 
management. 
The embedding of land reform in an agrarian paradigm may result in the 
omission of forestry issues resulting from the change in tenure. The neglect of 
the forestry aspect of the reform would be all the more important in the case 
of communitarian approaches to land reform because for marginalized 
communities that are obtaining land titles over forests the challenges that any 
economic agent or private firm has to face to undertake forest management 
will be compounded by the complications of organizing collective action and 
overcoming structural, administrative, information, and capital deficits.  
Conflict between the objectives of forest management and land reform 
may arise in cases where land reform is complemented by policies that 
promote land use change. A general point is that economic activities related to 
forests should not be overregulated and that alternative land uses should not 
be promoted. It is the case in almost all countries that the regulatory 
framework requires a number of conditions –often including cumbersome 
bureaucratic requirements– to be met in order to harvest and commercialize 
forest resources legally, while economic activities related to alternative land 
uses –such as agriculture and cattle ranching– are typically exempted from 
similar requirements. Similarly, a number of policies in the agrarian reform 
package stimulate the development of agricultural and pastoral activities; 
examples are the subsidies that make agricultural and pastures lands more 
profitable that end up promoting the expansion of the agricultural frontier 
beyond socio-economic and ecological rationality (see Repetto and Gillis, 1988 
and Binswanger, 1991). Taken together these type of regulations and incentives 
end up increasing the opportunity cost of forest and render land use change 
more convenient. 
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Furthermore institutional arrangements associated with land reform can 
also conflict with forest management and promote land use change, especially 
when deforestation is a requirement for secure tenure (Southgate and Runge, 
1990) and property rights frameworks do not recognize tenurial arrangement 
that are common in forests (Bromley and Cernea, 1989). 
4 THE BOLIVIAN CASE: WHAT LAND AND WHAT 
REFORM? 
The Institute of Agrarian Reform (“Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria”, 
INRA), in charge of implementing the reform, does not posses details on the 
type of land being titled, but the majority of land requested by indigenous 
communities is covered with forest and the communities claimed more than 20 
millions hectares of land (Pacheco, 2006a: 9).  
Data from 2007 show that out of the total 2,139,806 has identified for 
redistribution 1,410,858 has are to be managed as productive forest (INRA, 
2007: 72). In other words, almost 66% of the total area identified as state 
owned and available for redistribution for social and productive purposes 
(hence, excluding protected areas) is to be managed as forest. In contrast land 
classified as agricultural (for both intensive and extensive use) covers only 
around 181,123 has, or 8.5% of the total. 
The Bolivian Government, supported by donor agencies, has adopted an 
advanced method of land use planning matching biophysical characteristics of 
the soil with a participatory approach to public policies. The land use plans 
(“Planes de Uso del Suelo”, PLUS) recognised the fragility of large parts of 
Bolivia, the threats posed by desertification and acknowledged the ecological 
services provided by forest. Accordingly, land use was to follow the vocation 
of the territory as suggested by the ecosystems’ characteristics, but at the same 
time it was recognised that the interest and the knowledge of local 
communities had to be taken into consideration in land planning.4 As a result 
the formulation and approval of the PLUS was based on participatory 
principles and was the result of extensive consultations (Rojas et al., 2003: III, 
12). In 2001 a decree based on the PLUS identified around 40 millions of 
hectares as permanent productive forest (“tierras forestales de producción 
permanente”): land whose use could only be forest. Also the new constitution 
refers to the need of respecting the ‘vocation’ of the territory confirming that 
land should be managed sustainably according to its characteristics.5 
                                                 
4 Land use planning was implemented within the general orientation favouring 
participation of the Bolivian governments of the 1990s and was accompanied by 
initiatives such as the law on popular participation (“ley de participación popular”, 
Gobierno de Bolivia, 1994) and the national dialogues. In this policy context in order 
to deliver a good land use plan and a plan with chances to be implemented 
participation was considered a fundamental factor. 
5 (GOB, 2009 Artículo 387. I. El Estado deberá garantizar la conservación de los 
bosques naturales en las áreas de vocación forestal, su aprovechamiento sustentable, la 
conservación y recuperación de la flora, fauna y áreas degradadas). 
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Notwithstanding the objectives of maintaining forest cover on most of the 
land currently occupied by forest and the objective of sustainable forest 
management, the issue of forestry and its potential for poverty reduction is 
underestimated in the land reform process. However, given the prominence of 
forest land process, land reform in Bolivia has significant features of a forest 
tenure reform. 
In the words of the Bolivian Government “it is known that formal access 
to land and forest […] does not produce automatically benefits for local 
development” (Gobierno de Bolivia, 2007b; see also Larson and Ribot, 2007; 
Wunder, 2001). However, policies that should facilitate the communities in 
taking advantage of the new opportunities given by forest land titles and, at the 
same time, guarantee sustainable land use are not in place. The need of 
addressing the forestry question and the fact that under current conditions 
titling is not enough becomes clear once we look at the policy framework and 
the state of the forestry sector. 
5 FOREST MANAGEMENT 
Now we turn to a discussion of the policy framework for forest management: 
our purpose is to outline the policy environment in which the land reform is 
going to be nested and question whether the forestry question can be 
addressed under these conditions. Next we will overview the (under-) 
development of the forestry sector that is the result of this policy framework.  
Reform of Bolivia’s forestry sector occurred in the mid-1990s: the reform 
attempted to make access to forest resources more “democratic” and the 
approval of Forestry Law 1700 (Gobierno de Bolivia, 1996b) was a milestone 
that provided instruments for the poor to exploit forest resources in a legal 
way. This change followed the trend towards decentralization and community-
based natural resources management and its stated objective is achieving social 
inclusion and making communities stewards of the forest through a new social 
orientation of the legal framework. However, ten years after the law’s approval 
the legal framework has more a nominal rather than a factual value and the 
policies that should have lent substance to legal predicaments are not in place. 
These problems of implementation are compounded by contradictions that 
were already present in the formulation of the new policies.  
The law also contained environmental provisions: the forest must be 
managed according to a 20 years management plan, state-owned forest 
auctions should occur and concessions be distributed accordingly. A system of 
royalties should make the system self sustainable (financing investment, the 
regulatory framework, and partially contributing to financing local institutions). 
Extraction should follow management plans approved by the Forestry 
Superintendence that has the role to collect royalties and verify that the legal 
provisions are not violated. The structure of the model did focus on 
specialized knowledge, and fundamental to its enforcement were capable and 
honest forestry professionals (responsible for drawing up and implementing 
management plans) and state agents (responsible for overseeing the whole 
process). Overall, the regulatory framework set up by the 1996 law contained 
management modalities and enforcement structures informed by the scientific 
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forestry approach, as well as social objectives and inclusive measures that were 
in line with the latest developments in forest management thinking (see 
Pellegrini, 2009). 
At the state organizational level the Forestry Directorate is badly 
understaffed6 and under-funded and the Forest Superintendence is not able to 
fulfill its regulation and control role, let alone take on board new tasks.7 Still, 
the government is discussing the promotion of community forestry and 
creating a state enterprise to facilitate the operations of community enterprises. 
Overall, there is a striking contrast between the efforts, and the underpinning 
political will, to promote land reform and those for the development of the 
forestry sector. 
The relative (lack of) success of the current policy framework becomes 
clear if we analyze a few indicators that relate to socio-economic and 
environmental outcomes. Out of the 40 millions of hectares, classified as forest 
in Bolivia, around 30 million could be used for sustainable logging and the 
extraction of non-timber forest products (UDAPE, 2004; Pacheco, 2006a: 18, 
51),8 but only 8 millions hectares – less than 30% of the potential – are 
currently given in concession and have a management plan.9 Furthermore, the 
total volume of legally extracted logs is about 5% of the estimated sustainable 
potential (BOLFOR, 2009: 36). Taken together these data give a measure of 
the current state of affairs when compared to the socio-economic potential of 
forestry. Furthermore, according to FAO, the yearly deforestation rate for the 
period 2000- 2005 is 0.41% (FAO, 2007) and estimates for deforestation 
between 2004-2005 are as high as 1% of forest cover per year (Wachholtz et al., 
2006). Given the fact that around 54% of the Bolivian territory is covered by 
forest and that the country is one of the ten with most primary forest in the 
world (FAO, 2007), these deforestation rates imply that large expanses of 
(primary) forests are being lost every year. Overall, most of the forest is not 
following the legal management and the rest is either left unexploited, or 
degraded with illegal logging or affected by land use change and taken together 
these facts substantiate the failure of the current policy framework to achieve 
the objective of sustainable forest management. 
6 LAND REFORM AND THE FORESTRY 
QUESTION 
Bolivia has already experienced two land reforms: one in the 1950s and one in 
the 1990s that is still to be completed. The first land reform was an outcome of 
the 1952 revolution and its aim was redressing the conditions of inequality and 
extreme poverty that were the very reasons for the upraising (Kay and Urioste, 
2007). 
                                                 
6 As of April 2007 it was staffed only by 9 people based in the capital, La Paz. 
7 This state of affairs in these important institutions casts doubts on state capability to 
implement such policies. 
8 Of the total amount 10.7 millions hectares are protected areas and 2.4 millions have 
some restrictions related to the provision of ecological services. 
9 Terrazas-Sedlak (Cámara Forestal), 2007, personal communication. 
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The second major land reform legislation was enacted in 1996 (Gobierno 
de Bolivia, 1996a) but its implementation was so timid that only a fraction of 
land has been titled within the 10 years time frame stipulated in 1996. The 
Morales government, elected in 2006, is giving a new impetus to complete land 
reform and has also promoted a new law with a communitarian vision. For the 
current government, land reform is a flagship programme aiming to provide 
access to land to landless citizens, small landowners and to indigenous 
communities through land titles and security of tenure (Gobierno de Bolivia, 
2007a).  
While the lack of political will marked the implementation period of the 
1996 land reform, the implementation of the same law and of the new law 
(approved in 2007) has accelerated and, in accordance with the government’s 
discourse, the reform has achieved a new momentum. Relevant manifestations 
of the political will that now underpins the process are the achievements of the 
INRA in terms of quantity of land titled and the establishment of reasonably 
reliable land records. In terms of titled areas, in the first decade after the 1996 
land reform less land has been titled than in the years 2006-2007 (namely in the 
decade 1996-2006 9.2 million hectares were titled, while in the years 2006-2007 
10.4 million has were titled; INRA, 2008: 129). Furthermore, great efforts have 
been expended in order to improve the cadastral services and to keep the 
records updated (INRA, 2008: 125). These data, apart from demonstrating the 
new political will, are also suggesting an increase in tenure security for all the 
forests that are included in the titling program. 
Another issue that the government is dealing with are the linkages of the 
land reform with rural development strategies.  In the national development 
plan (Gobierno de Bolivia, 2006) the land reform process is nested in a array of 
initiatives aiming at rural development; these initiatives include extension 
activities such as loans at 0% interest in order to acquire production tools 
(especially machinery such as tractors) and inputs (such as seeds and fertilizers) 
and instruments specifically aiming at the achievement of food sovereignty 
(Gobierno de Bolivia, 2007b). 
The Bolivian land reform has many features of the communitarian vision: 
this approach was already present in the 1996 formulation, it is further 
emphasised in the 2007 law and matches the traditional features of indigenous 
people of Bolivia. The multicultural and plural character of the country is 
recognised and traditional authority structures are acknowledged, can represent 
local communities in the land titling process and can eventually manage titled 
lands (Assies, 2006).  
Overall, in Bolivia we find that the standard conditions for a successful 
land reform, within the agrarian paradigm, are (to a certain extent) addressed 
and that the approach that the Bolivian government is following falls squarely 
within the traditional approaches of the agrarian reform and communitarian 
land reform.  
This way to frame land reform has implications with respect to forestry 
and the first is the thorough neglect of the forestry issue within land reform. 
This neglect is manifest already in the taxonomy used in the land reform legal 
documents where the land reform itself is called ‘agrarian reform’ (reforma 
agraria) and the main state organization in charge of the reform is called 
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‘National Institute for Agrarian Reform’ (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria). 
In general, forestry issues are discussed very seldom in the documents of the 
‘Agrarian reform’. 
Furthermore, in one of the few statements from government sources on 
the land use of the territory that is being titled, the land vice-minister has 
admitted that of the 2.5 million hectares identified as state owned and hence 
available for redistribution up to 2006, almost all of it is forest but also that 
forest redistribution cannot solve the land problem in Bolivia. Also social 
movements engaged that the redistribution of land, when it is forest, is ‘just a 
show’; both parties evidently implying that forest areas are economically 
useless and are not of interest in the land reform process.10 
During the current reform efforts in the process of writing the regulation 
of the new law of land reform approved in 2006, the Forestry Directorate 
(“Dirección Forestal”), which should be in charge of the promotion of forestry 
development, has been excluded on the basis that the law involves only the 
agrarian sector; a claim at odds with evidence that titles are demanded mostly 
on forests. 
These facts are symptomatic of the general undervaluation of the issue of 
forestry in the process. Neglecting the forestry issue in the land reform process 
is all the more remarkable given the failure of the current policy framework to 
develop the potential of the forestry sector. 
In addition to omissions measures that actually contradict the objective of 
sustainable forest management are in the policy framework. These 
contradictions, as mentioned above, occur every time policies and institutional 
arrangements favour land uses that are alternative to forest. All subsides to 
agricultural and pastoral activities, when not coupled with similar incentives for 
the development of the forest-based economic activities, contribute to increase 
the opportunity cost of forest land. Given the neglect and lack of coordination 
of forestry and agrarian policies, the current interventions that unilaterally 
promote the development of the agrarian sector undermine the viability of 
forest management and promote land use change (see Chomitz and Buys, 
2007).  
Titling and clarifications of rights associated with land reform have a 
positive effect on forest tenure, but with respect to forest management the 
implications are complex because of the modalities in which titling is taking 
place. The Bolivian land reform, similarly to other reforms in Latin America, 
beginning with the Mexican one, is inspired by the ‘doctrine of social use’ 
according to which the sanctity of private property is subordinated to the social 
function of property  (Ankersen and Ruppert, 2006). In Bolivia the doctrine of 
social use plays out in the provisions according to which land must satisfy 
‘socio-economic functions’ and ‘unused’ land should be expropriated. In 
practice, given the fact that forest management is not economically viable in 
most cases, the most straight forward way to prove use is to deforest. This is a 
                                                 
10 See, www.econoticiasbolivia.com/documentos/agricultura/evotierra2.html and “Ni 
revolución ni reforma agraria, sólo show” 
www.econoticiasbolivia.com/documentos/agricultura/evotierra3.html, both accessed on the 
15th June 2009. 
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practice common in other land reforms throughout the continent and can 
explain how land reform and increased tenure security is often associated with 
deforestation (e.g. Southgate and Runge, 1990).  
Also colonization programs that (explicitly or implicitly) promote the 
expansion of the agricultural frontier are in conflict with the objective of 
sustainable forest management and the abysmal record of state-sponsored 
colonization programs in the 1970s throughout Latin America is substantiated 
by evidence that they have been one of the main sources of ‘state-led’ 
deforestation (Rudel, 2007) and the episodes of colonization in Bolivia are also 
associated with high rates of deforestation (Kaimowitz et al., 2002; Pacheco, 
2006b). Now the government has a new colonization program (INRA, 2007) 
and has effectively started to put it in practice on the 11th of August 2009, by 
moving 400 men to Pando. The rightwing opposition and also social 
movements have argued that the ultimate goal of these settlements is to alter 
the electoral fortunes of the party of the president Morales in Pando rather 
than to improve the livelihoods of the people involved and the equitable use of 
land resources. Apart from these worries, doubts can be raised about the 
impact on forest of this initiative given the record of deforestation that 
characterised previous settlements programs and the forestry vocation of the 
area where these settlements are taking place. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
To conclude, the land reform of Bolivia has actually many aspects of a forest 
tenure reform, but is not associated with instruments to face challenges and 
opportunities of titling forests. Past experiences of land reform failed because 
of missing proper enabling conditions, for the development of the rural 
economy and drawing a parallel to those experiences and in Bolivia these 
conditions include the development of the forestry sector. If the objective is 
also to give communal tenure (as it is happening with the titling of much 
indigenous territory), the conditions will include also provisions for communal 
resource management and for the building of coalitions and partnerships 
between communities and other actors in the sector. In general, it is necessary 
to broaden the land reform agenda and look for opportunities and synergies 
with the forestry sector. Neglecting forestry and not dealing with provisions in 
the land reform process that conflict with forest management might result in a 
failure of land reform. This failure would not be due to land reform per se, but 
to the omission of the forestry issues in the debate and the policy measures 
linked to the land reform. Analogies to earlier failures of land reform are 
difficult to escape. As land reform of agricultural lands cannot solve rural 
development problems without addressing agricultural issues, similarly 
successful land reform of forest land cannot elude forestry issues. 
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